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INTRODUCTION
Although Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis (EMH), which represent standard finance, are success-
ful, the alternative approach of behavioral finance includes psycho-
logical and sociological issues when investigating market anomalies 
and individual investor behavior. In the financial markets, we often 
observe some phenomena which cannot be explained rationally. For 
example, we do not have any logical evidences on random walk in 
the stock price movement while many fund managers use several 
behavioral concepts in their investment strategy. In corporate per-
spectives, company owners and managers do not rely only on logical 
elements to make critical decisions on mergers and acquisitions and 
new investment. 
Two of the key topics discussed in behavioral finance are the be-
havioral finance macro, which recognizes “anomalies” in the EMH 
that behavioral models can explain, and the behavioral finance mi-
cro, which recognizes individual investor behavior, or biases that 
are not explained by the traditional models incorporating rational 
behavior. In particular, we employ the behavioral finance micro be-
cause it explains a number of important financing and investment 
patterns by using a behavioral approach, which expands on the 
research in the behavioral corporate finance field. This paper sum-
marizes these two major topics in behavioral finance, which include 
behavioral corporate finance, and introduces evidence that adopts 
behavioral concepts in the actual financial market. It also describes 
challenges to behavioral finance by reviewing recent studies and 
surveys.
Recently acknowledged theories in academic finance are called 
standard or traditional finance theories. Based on the standard fi-
nance paradigm, scholars have sought to understand financial mar-
kets using models that presume that investors are rational. MPT 
and the EMH form the basis of traditional finance models1). How-
  1) Harry Markowitz introduced MPT in 1952, and he illustrated relationships 
between portfolio choices and beliefs in terms of the “expected returns–variance 
of returns” rule. Ricciardi and Simon (2000) defined MPT as an expected return, 
while standard deviations of particular securities or portfolios are correlated with 
the other securities or mutual funds held within one portfolio. Another major 
concept is known as the EMH, which states that investors cannot consistently 
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ever, if researchers only use the MPT and EMH, individual investor 
behavior is not easily understood. 
In contrast, behavioral finance is a relatively new concept in the fi-
nancial markets, and is not employed within standard finance mod-
els; it replaces traditional finance models, and it offers a better mod-
el for human behavior. Although MPT and the EMH are considered 
as successful in financial market analysis, the behavioral finance 
model has been developed as one of the alternative theories for stan-
dard finance. Behavioral finance examines the impact of psychol-
ogy on market participants’ behavior and the resulting outcomes in 
markets, focusing on how individual investors make decisions: in 
particular, how they interpret and act on specific information. In-
vestors do not always have rational and predictable reactions when 
examined through the lens of quantitative models, which means 
that investors’ decision-making processes also include cognitive bi-
ases and affective (emotional) aspects. The behavioral finance model 
emphasizes investor behavior, leading to various market anomalies 
and inefficiencies. This new concept for finance explains individual 
behavior and group behavior by integrating the fields of sociology, 
psychology, and other behavioral sciences. It also predicts financial 
markets. Research in behavioral corporate finance studies highlights 
investors’ and managers’ irrationality, and shows nonstandard pref-
erences, and judgmental biases in managerial decisions. Currently, 
many companies apply behavioral approaches to determine impor-
tant finance and investment patterns.
Several theories under the banner of traditional finance develop 
specific models by assuming the EMH and they explain phenomena 
in markets; however, in the real financial market, many problems 
and cases cannot easily be explained via those standardized 
models. In the cases involving managers or investors, unbiased 
forecasts about future events need to be developed and used to 
make decisions that best serve their own interests. In this type of 
situation, we need to entertain more realistic behavioral aspects, 
as there is evidence for irrational behavior patterns that cannot be 
explained by the traditional or standard financial theories. To be 
specific, Shefrin (2009) pointed out that the root cause of the global 
achieve an excessive return over market returns on a risk-adjusted basis because 
all publicly available information is already reflected in a security’s market price, 
and the current security price is its fair value.
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financial crisis of 2008 was a psychological, not fundamental phe-
nomenon. Risk-seeking behaviors were evident in the loss-dominant 
markets, while excessive optimism and confirmation bias acted as 
driving factors behind the crisis, and not fundamental factors such 
as terrorism, skyrocketing oil prices, or disruptive changes in the 
weather. We can understand, identify, and address psychological 
distortions in judgments and decisions by considering behavioral 
concepts, and then we can integrate both traditional and behavioral 
factors to be better prepared for dealing with any psychological 
challenges. As mentioned, managerial decisions are strongly affected 
by cognitive biases and emotional aspects in real financial markets, 
as human beings are not machines. Additionally, evidence of 
mispricing and market anomalies that cannot be fully explained by 
traditional models, is prevalent.
Thus, we would like to propose behavioral finance in this paper 
to clearly explain a number of important financing and investment 
patterns, aiding investors in understanding several abnormal 
phenomena by integrating behavioral concepts with existing 
rationales within standard finance models.
Ricciardi and Simon (2000) defined behavioral finance in the fol-
lowing manner: “Behavioral finance attempts to explain and increase 
understanding of the reasoning patterns of investors, including the 
emotional processes involved and the degree to which they influ-
ence the decision-making process. Essentially, behavioral finance 
attempts to explain the what, why, and how of finance and invest-
ment, from a human perspective” (Page 2) (See figure 1). Shefrin 
(2000), however, mentioned the difference between cognitive and af-
fective (emotional) factors: “cognitive aspects concern the way people 
organize their information, while the emotional aspects deal with the 
way people feel as they register information” (Page 29).
We understand that there are several survey literatures on be-
havioral finance. However, this paper differs from the literature in 
several aspects. We introduce more recent papers in the field and 
expand the research scope to studies on Korean financial markets. 
We introduce more literature on behavioral corporate finance, pro-
vide statistics on the recent trends that are evident in behavioral fi-
nance papers, introduce the specific funds that are using behavioral 
finance techniques, and discuss the challenges of the behavioral 
finance model. 
This paper summarizes the recent studies in behavioral finance, 
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particularly regarding market anomalies and investor behavior, 
which cannot be explained by traditional finance paradigms. In 
section 2, we introduce two topics in behavioral finance: cognitive 
biases and the limits of arbitrage. In section 3, we summarize the 
research on behavioral corporate finance. In section 4, we examine 
behavioral applications via two routes: evidence from real invest-
ments and specific evidence from the Korean financial market. In 
section 5, we analyze the recent developments in behavioral finance 
publications. Section 6 discusses several challenges to behavioral 
finance and ends with suggestions for future research.
TWO TOPICS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Behavioral finance is a study that combines psychology and 
economics, and it tries to explain various events that take place 
in financial markets. For example, from the behavioral finance 
Source: Ricciardi and Simon (2000)
Figure 1. The Underpinning of Behavioral Finance
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perspective, some individuals’ limitations and problems are shown 
in the expected utility theory and in arbitrage assumptions. In 
particular, there are two representative topics in behavioral finance: 
cognitive psychology and the limits of arbitrage.2)
Cognitive Biases
Under the traditional and standard financial theories, investors 
are viewed as being rational. Basically, a rational economic person 
is an individual who tries to achieve discretely specified goals in the 
most comprehensive and consistent way while minimizing any eco-
nomic costs. A rational economic person’s choices are determined 
by his or her utility function. In contrast, modern theory in behav-
ioral finance suggests that investors’ decisions are subject to several 
  2) Cognitive psychology is the scientific study of human beings’ cognition or the 
mental processes considered to form human behavior. The perspectives on 
the limits of arbitrage predict the effectiveness of arbitrage forces under any 
circumstances. Behavioral finance finds that some individual investors are not 
completely rational due to specific preferences or mistaken beliefs, and that the 
EMH cannot explain all of these circumstances. Behavioral finance assumes that 
financial markets are not efficient in particular circumstances with regard to 
information and this inefficiency can be explained by the psychological biases of 
investors.
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Table 2. SSRN Database Search Counts of Behavioral Finance Topics 














Illusions of Control 50
Downside Risk 446
























10 Seoul Journal of Business
cognitive illusions. Scholars of contemporary behavioral finance feel 
that the field’s most direct roots are founded in cognitive psycholo-
gy.3)
Many topics within the arena of behavioral finance relate to cog-
nitive psychology, and Ricciardi and Simon (2000) introduced a 
checklist for behavioral finance topics (See table 1). These topics 
cover various aspects in the behavioral finance literature that have 
been studied over the past 30 years. The validity of these topics is, 
and will be continuously examined as behavioral finance scholars 
investigate and implement concepts, or as other practices start to 
diminish, or are discarded. The concepts included in the behavioral 
finance checklist have been actively studied in various articles, as 
shown in the Social Science research Network (SSRN) (See table 2).
 
Prospect Theory
One of the important concepts in behavioral finance that helps 
individual investors make decisions is prospect theory, as initiated 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979).4) Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
  3) Research in cognitive psychology investigates various topics such as perception, 
attention, creativity, memory, reasoning, knowledge representation, and problem 
solving. Cognitive psychology also explains human thought in terms of input, 
representation, processing, and output.
  4) Prospect theory essentially describes the way individual investors assess gains 
and losses differently. A value function, passing over this reference point and 
assigning a “value” to each positive and negative result, shows an asymmetrical 
S-shaped curve (See figure 2). This curve reflects loss aversion, which is a 
tendency to assess the impact of losses much more heavily than that of gains in 
a domain-gains situation. This phenomenon can be considered as risk seeking in 
Table 2. (continued)
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experimental results showed evidence to explain people’s behavior 
when this did not follow the assumptions and predictions of the ex-
pected utility theory. Markowitz (1952) first proposed that individu-
als are affected by changes more easily in terms of asset values than 
in net asset levels, and in gains and losses from a reference point, 
rather than from levels of wealth and welfare. Tversky and Kahne-
man (1991) cited the dependence on a reference as the key analytic 
assumption in prospect theory. It shows the opposite side of indi-
viduals’ expected utility function, which commonly defines asset 
levels. Prospect theory also analyzes how individuals often mentally 
“frame” the predicted results in very subjective terms, which affects 
the expected utility accordingly. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) as-
serted that the reference point is generally consistent with the cur-
rent position of the decision maker, but they acknowledge that this 
is not always the case. The framing of the reference point can also 
terms of domain losses, which is named the reflection effect.
Source: Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
Figure 2. S-shaped curve
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be influenced by the following concepts: aspirations, expectations, 
social comparisons, and social norms.
Barberis and Thaler (2003) considered this theory as the most 
successful tool in capturing experimental results. They argued that 
prospect theory should not be considered as a normative theory in 
finance: It only tentatively seeks to capture people’s behavior in pre-
ferring risky gambles. Mullainathan and Thaler (2000) also regarded 
prospect theory as an excellent example of a behavioral economic 
theory because it integrates the theoretical components of finance 
with several important psychological features. They also recom-
mended three key concepts of the prospect theory in terms of the 
following value functions: overconfidence, loss aversion, and mental 
accounting.
Limits of Arbitrage
The traditional finance theories assume that market prices 
are correct in that they reflect the fair value of the security, and 
that arbitrageurs are successful in exploiting any free-lunch 
opportunities when the prices deviate from the fair values. The EMH 
is established based on these assumptions, and accordingly, it does 
not allow for the limits of arbitrage that are widely observed in the 
real world.
Mispricing and Arbitrage Opportunities
According to one of the major principles of the EMH, prices are 
correct in the sense that asset prices reflect the fair value of the 
security. In a rational and efficient market, individuals are not 
granted a free lunch, so no investment strategy can make excessive 
risk-adjusted average returns.
Behavior finance, however, argues that many deviations in asset 
prices exist, and these deviations are brought about by irrational 
investors. According to Friedman (1953), there are two common 
situations in a financial market. First, when there is a mispricing 
and the current asset price deviates from the fundamental value, 
the opportunity for arbitrage is created as an attractive investment 
opportunity. Second, rational investors will immediately seize this 
opportunity, and then the mispricing will be corrected. 
Behavioral finance criticizes the second step. Even if attractive 
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opportunities become revealed to, and recognized by traders, these 
opportunities may well not be exploited immediately; as a result, the 
mispricing can remain unchanged. During the first step, an arbitrage 
opportunity is often considered to be a riskless strategy. However, 
behavioral finance argues that this is very risky, and investors are 
considered not as arbitrageurs, but as noise traders. Another well-
known example is the case of the same stock being traded in two 
different places, as described by Froot and Dabora (1999). In this 
instance, the two shares have the same characteristics and should 
be traded in a certain ratio in line with a concept that assumes a 
rational model. However, in reality, they are not: the actual price 
level deviates from the expected price by more than 35%. This case 
demonstrated that prices can deviate from the intrinsic value due to 
the limits of arbitrage. Malkiel (2003) also introduced evidence indi-
cating that investors cannot create a portfolio trading opportunity 
by making extraordinarily excessive risk-adjusted returns, even in 
anomalous stock market environments.  
Lamont and Thaler (2003) also observed violations of the law 
of one price in US technology stocks. They proved that arbitrage 
does not always enforce rational pricing due to its inability and 
unwillingness to carry out arbitrage in real markets. Fedenia and 
Hirschey (2009) explained how the law of one price is repeatedly vio-
lated in the price-trading history of a recent equity carve-out. They 
showed that economically equivalent assets continue to remain 
mispriced for significant periods of time and the degree of such mis-
pricing can actually increase over time. They saw the apparent mis-
pricing in two different types of common shares within the context 
of prior research on equity carve-outs, and documented how this 
finding is inconsistent with various EMHs.
Unpredictability and Random Walk
The other principle of the EMH is unpredictability. The EMH is 
related to the idea of a “random walk,” which explains an aspect 
of price movement: subsequent prices deviate from previous ones 
as a random movement. As any publicly-available information is 
already reflected in securities’ prices, today’s price changes will be 
influenced only by today’s news, and will not be affected by the price 
movements of yesterday. Even when prices show extremely volatile 
movement, they are brought back to equilibrium by the mean-
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regression model. 
Since the start of the 21st century, however, the dominant trend of 
the EMH has become far less common. Many financial economists 
believe that securities’ prices are not fully predictable, but they are 
at least partially foreseeable. Those researchers apply psychological 
and sociological factors to determine stock price. They believe that 
price movements are not random at all, and that future stock prices 
are predictable on the basis of historical price patterns. They also 
insist that many investors will be able to make excessive returns 
by considering such aspects. A study conducted by De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) introduced the Investor Over-reaction Hypothesis, as 
opposed to the EMH. Individual investors tend to over-react to new 
information and devalue prior information when incorporating new 
data. They referred to representativeness heuristics, which means 
that investors are unduly optimistic about recent winner stocks, 
while simultaneously being extremely pessimistic about recent 
loser stocks; most investors tend to over-react to both good and bad 
news. Over-reaction also makes the previous loser stocks become 
undervalued, which leads the previous winner stocks becoming 
overvalued; from this, these theorists can thus derive a prediction 
about future returns: past loser stocks should under-perform, while 
past winner stocks should outperform the market (De Bondt and 
Thaler 1985).  
However, other recent studies find cases of unpredictability that 
show the opposite pattern from that of over-reaction introduced by 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985), known as under-reaction. According to 
Shleifer (2000), an initial price jump in stocks can occur on the day 
of a specific announcement, which can influence the fundamental 
value via large earnings changes, dividend payout plans, share 
repurchases, splits, and seasoned equity offerings, followed by a 
slow drift in the same direction for a certain period of time. Over 
short periods of time, less than a year, stocks also show display 
momentum—the stocks that go up the fastest over the course of 
six months try to keep going up. These findings regarding under-
reaction are a further challenge to the EMH.
Both over- and under-reaction rely on psychological evidence, 
and they all explain market anomalies by highlighting different time 
horizons between under-reaction and over-reaction; under-reaction 
continues for a short period of time, while over-reaction appears for 
longer. These trends are currently changing the nature of finance.
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Examples of Arbitrages: Costs and Limitations
The traditional concept of arbitrage in theoretical rational financial 
markets requires neither capital, nor any financial risks. However, 
in reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, which entails risk in 
a real financial market. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) thus introduced 
professional arbitrage, which is conducted by a relatively small 
number of highly specialized investors using other people’s money. 
In particular, many researchers consider arbitrage, which requires 
additional risky capital, to be a very important issue in the agency 
problem. Without the agency problem, arbitrageurs are often more 
aggressive when prices deviate further from fundamental values. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) gave an example involving Bunds.5) 
In their Bund example, an arbitrageur would generally increase 
positions as long as s/he has the capital if contract prices between 
London and Frankfurt move further from their fundamental value. 
However, when an arbitrageur manages other people’s capital, and 
customers do not have any idea how this arbitrageur operates, or 
exactly what the manager is doing, they can only observe that the 
arbitrageur is losing money when futures prices in London vary 
from those in Frankfurt. They often refuse to provide more capital, 
or withdraw money, even when the expected return on the funds 
is increasing. In this article, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argued 
that investors cannot use arbitrage opportunities effectively to 
achieve market efficiency. They also analyzed which markets attract 
arbitrage and why some markets are more attractive for arbitrage 
than others. Consequently, high volatility makes arbitrage less 
attractive if the expected return does not increase identically with 
volatility; in particular, this is true when fundamental risk is a 
substantial part of volatility.6) Finally, such arbitrage activities are 
not effective in bringing the securities price back to the fundamental 
  5) Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider the simple case of two Bund futures 
contracts to deliver DM250,000 in face value of German bonds at time T: one 
traded in London on LIFFE and the other in Frankfurt on DTB.
  6) Fundamental risk is defined as an exposure to loss from a situation affecting a 
large group of people or firms, and caused by natural or social phenomenon such 
as earthquake, war, inflation, unemployment, etc. Unlike this risk, idiosyncratic 
risk is considered as the risk of price change due to the unique circumstances 
of a specific security, as opposed to the overall market. This risk can be virtually 
eliminated from a portfolio through diversification.
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value, especially in extreme circumstances.
Pontiff (1996) identified significant arbitrage costs and showed 
that these costs are related to large deviations in prices from 
fundamental values. When costs make arbitrage unprofitable, 
mispricing is not fully eliminated. He considered four factors 
that affect arbitrage profitability in a costly arbitrage framework: 
systematic risk, which refers to the security’s fundamental risk 
that cannot be diversifiable; a smaller dividends payout; lower 
market value with higher transaction costs; and a higher interest 
rate. He found that the fundamental risk that cannot be hedged 
lowers arbitrage profits because arbitrage is a risk-averse activity. 
Dividends increase arbitrage profits since they reduce holding 
costs. Bid–ask spreads, commissions, and market impact are 
transaction costs that the arbitrageur makes in initiating and 
closing the arbitrage position. Interest rates are an opportunity 
cost, since arbitrageurs do not receive the full amount of interest 
when executing short-sale transactions. Consequently, the existence 
of complicated traders does not guarantee that prices reflect 
fundamental values because costs may hinder profitable arbitrage, 
and in particular, closed-end fund discounts appear to be the 
result of mispricing. This study showed that closed-end funds are 
subject to greater arbitrage pressure than typical securities, since 
the risk associated with a corrective trade of a closed-end fund is 
easier to hedge. If the magnitude of other arbitrage costs is similar, 
mispricing would be larger for typical common stocks. In addition, 
the market value of a closed-end fund is more likely to deviate from 
the value of its assets for funds with portfolios that are difficult to 
replicate, to pay out smaller dividends, and to have larger relative 
bid–ask spreads, while mispricing is greater over time when interest 
rates are high. Both the cross-sectional and time-series results are 
specifically related to the magnitude of the deviation, as opposed to 
its direction.
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) surveyed past studies regarding the 
limits of arbitrage, explained market anomalies, and introduced 
welfare, and policy debates into financial markets by using a 
rational framework. Indeed, this paper’s meaningful outcomes 
were partly generated by their study on the limits of arbitrage 
from welfare and public-policy perspectives. They emphasized the 
role of financial institutions and agencies in asset pricing. Their 
study tried to explain market anomalies in a completely rational 
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framework and to provide a useful foundation for designing and 
evaluating public policy. Gromb and Vayanos also stressed the role 
of specialized institutions as liquidity providers in financial mar-
kets. We can design and assess public policy by understanding 
the trading decisions of financial institutions and by checking the 
validity of these decisions to determine whether they are socially 
optimal and whether they affect the institutions’ financial health. 
Although many researchers recognize the relationship between 
market anomalies and asset markets, they are still in the beginning 
stages of analyzing asset markets with limited arbitrage. Gromb and 
Vayanos rearranged the existing studies and emphasized what they 
saw as the main topics, issues, challenges, and promises involved.
BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE
 
Behavioral finance has important implications in practical 
corporate finance. All market participants face several decisions in 
their financial activities regarding such aspects as investments and 
funding (for capital structure). Behavioral corporate finance has also 
developed in line with framing, decision-making, and the perception 
of many corporate issues. In particular, financial decision-making is 
one of the central aspects to behavioral corporate finance. According 
to Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004), behavioral corporate finance 
separates the roles of investors and managers, and describes each 
decision regarding financing and investment patterns.
Investors’ Perspectives
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) assumed that there are both 
rational managers and irrational investors in any given financial 
market. They considered two things: one, irrational investors can 
influence securities prices, which results in mispricing; and two, 
managers should be smart enough to distinguish market prices and 
securities’ fundamental values. They thought corporate managers 
were smart enough to identify mispricing due to information 
asymmetry. Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler also introduced a 
theoretical framework regarding mispricing and the ability of “smart” 
managers, and they applied it to practical examples.
In real investments, mispricing can affect financial decision-
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making in two different ways. First, investors might overestimate 
the result of a certain investment when they do not know that the 
price of that company is overvalued (value-destruction investment). 
On the other hand, financially constrained firms might be forced to 
give up valuable investment opportunities. That is, investors may 
make value-destruction investments while denying value-added 
investments.
Irrational investors’ perspectives can also be applied to mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) cases. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggested 
a market timing model for acquisitions. They assumed that a 
company that attempts to buy another one is overvalued, and that 
the purpose of acquisitions is not to enhance business synergy, 
but to preserve some of its temporary overvaluation for long-term 
shareholders. Thus, the acquirer can gain a long-term cushion 
effect, while offering a larger premium to the target company. The 
model also predicts that acquisitions completed with cash can 
expect positive long-run returns, while acquisitions completed 
with stock can expect negative long-run returns. Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh (2003), and Ang and Chang (2003) introduced 
recent evidence of market-timing M&A. They found that mispricing 
is positively correlated with the volume of the merger and acquirers 
tend to be more overpriced than target companies.
There are several other cases regarding financial policy that 
can be found in irrational investors’ approaches such as equity 
issues and repurchases, debt issues, cross-border issues, and 
capital structure. We can also consider corporate decisions such 
as dividend policy, firm name changes, earnings management, and 
executive compensation.
Managers’ Perspectives
Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2004) also assumed the op-
posite case of the investors’ perspectives. There are irrational 
managers in an efficient capital market, and they influence nu-
merous decisions. Corporate governance might not exist or might 
be limited, as irrational managers need to affect the market. 
Managers overestimate their abilities and tend to assume that they 
maximize firm value. Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler built a theoretical 
framework to analyze irrational managers’ approaches. If there is no 
optimal capital structure, managers will not do anything. Further, 
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optimistic managers tend to overinvest due to the absence of an 
upper boundary in the debt class, and the level of overinvestment 
declines when managers need equity to invest.
In real investments, we can consider “startup” investments. 
Most entrepreneurs establish companies with overconfidence and 
optimism. Cooper, Woo, and Dunkelberg (1998) found that 68% of 
entrepreneurs think that their startup companies are more likely 
to be successful than comparable rivals, while only 5% believe 
that their odds are worse, and a third of entrepreneurs view their 
success as essentially guaranteed. However, the actual performance 
of startup investments is weaker than expected.
Optimism and overconfidence patterns also exist in M&A cases. 
Successful acquirers might be optimistic and overconfident 
when they assess an M&A deal value and its synergies, and they 
sometimes fail to consider the winner’s curse. Malmendier and 
Tate (2003) studied CEOs’ optimism through this argument. First, 
optimistic CEOs execute more mergers for managerial diversification 
than do pessimistic CEOs. Second, optimism has its biggest effect 
among the least equity-dependent firms. Third, investors are 
more skeptical about bid announcements when they are made by 
optimistic CEOs.
There are several other cases regarding financial policy and 
behavioral patterns from irrational managers’ perspectives: capital 
structure, financial contracting, bounded rationality, and reference-
point preferences in prospect theory.
APPLICATIONS
Evidence from Real Investment Tools
Behavioral finance is applicable to the real financial world as one 
of the key investment strategies. Both behavioral funds and other 
financial products can be related to behavioral finance theories.
Behavioral Funds
The history of behavioral funds started in the early 1990s when JP 
Morgan, LVS Asset Management, and two representative scholars in 
the behavioral finance field, Fuller and Thaler, started the JP Mor-
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Table 3. Marketable Funds Using Behavioral Finance




The first investment 
fund using 
behavioral finance 
theory by Russell 




behavior and to use 
it to earn excess 









Germany. The fund 
uses technical 
and fundamental 
analysis, as well as 
behavioral finance 
when selecting the 
asset mix.
To seek long-term 
growth.
The fund invests at 
least 51% of assets 
in a mix of various 
sub-funds. The asset 
allocation remains 









To achieve an 
absolute return 
with a long/short 
strategy.
The exact asset 
allocation is 
determined by a 
proprietary analysis 
and selection tool 











The fund invests in 
a globally diversified 
portfolio of equities, 
bonds, and equity 
sub-funds. The fund 
uses a combination 
of technical and 
fundamental 


















applies a behavioral 
finance approach.
To focus on total 
return.
The fund invests 
mainly in European 
government bonds 
and mortgage bonds. 
Additionally, the fund 
can invest in other 
fixed and variable 
rate securities, 











applies a “protect 
strategy” based on 
a behavioral finance 
approach.
To produce yields 




The fund invests 
mainly in investment 









To achieve an 
absolute return 
with a long/short 
strategy.
The fund invests in 
liquid US equities 
both on the long 
and the short side. 
The stock selection 
is based on a top-
down multi-factor 
sector rotation model, 




Dog Fund Open-ended and 
long-only fund 
incorporated 
in the Cayman 
Islands. The fund 
uses behavioral 
finance theories 
to exploit market 
irrationalities.
To seek long-term 
capital growth.
The fund typically 
invests into previously 
badly performing 
equities in the US 
S&P500 Index.
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Table 3. (continued)
Fund Name Fund Type Fund Objective Asset Allocation
LGT Global 
Active Timer 







process is based 
on a behavioral 
finance investment 
philosophy.





bull markets are 
expected while 
decreasing equity 









To outperform a 
portfolio consisting 
of international 
equities using a 
behavioral finance 
approach.
The fund invests 
primarily in equities, 
equity-related 
securities, fixed 
income, and up to 5% 
in money market-, 












approach based on 
behavioral finance 
aspects.
To seek absolute 
return.
The fund invests 
mainly in futures 
contracts on the 
European bond 
and stock market, 
and money market 
instruments.
Maestro-














To achieve the 
highest possible 
return in the 
reference currency.
The fund invests in 
the equity markets 
through the use of 
derivatives.
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gan Undiscovered Value Fund (UBVLX). Since the launch of UBVLX, 
several other investment funds have emerged in the market. Accord-
ing to Bloomberg, 13 funds employ the key concepts of behavioral 
finance, as follows (See table 3).
From performance perspectives, investment funds based on be-
havioral finance theory have under-performed or have been on a par 
with benchmarks compared to other actively managed funds. Ac-
cording to Santoni and Kelshiker (2010), there is no clear evidence 
that behavioral mutual funds outperform their benchmarks, and be-
havioral funds actually have limited performance consistency.7) They 
also noted that behavioral funds do not have the capacity to forecast 
market turning points. However, they also presented the positive 
side to behavioral funds. Behavioral funds have lower price volatility 
than their benchmarks, and we can therefore apply some common 
behavioral biases to the market such as the January effect.
Behavioral Products in JP Morgan8)
Baker and Sesia (2007) introduced investment strategies using 
behavioral finance concepts in JP Morgan.9) The behavioral finance 
  7) For example, only one fund in three (1/3) outperformed independent bull markets 
and only 30% of funds outperformed in two out of three (2/3) bull markets.
  8) Behavioral finance strategies in JP Morgan were developed by Andrew Spencer 
and started in 1992 in London. At the end of 2006, two-thirds of the US$76bn 
AUM in behavioral finance products was in non-US stocks. JP Morgan started 
its behavioral finance product with a fund called Premier Equity Growth, and it 
surpassed the benchmark for nine of its first ten years. After that, JP Morgan 
introduced two new behavioral funds: UK Strategic Value and UK Dynamic.
  9) JP Morgan is a part of JP Morgan Chase & Co.; it is a leading global financial 
Table 3. (continued)







approach is based 
on behavioral 
finance theory.
To seek mid- to 
long-term returns 
and growth.
The fund invests 
globally in a wide 
array of stocks 
selected by a 
quantitative model 
regardless of the 
political correctness 
of the stock selection.
Source: Bloomberg 
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team in JP Morgan believes that irrational investor behavior exists 
in the market, which creates market anomalies. JP Morgan’s start-
ing point is empirical evidence from both academic and practitioner 
studies that stocks with specific characteristics consistently out-
perform others. JP Morgan states that fund outperformance cannot 
be explained by risk, but can be justified by human psychological 
biases. They emphasize two representative behavioral biases: over-
confidence and loss aversion, which have the most powerful effects 
on stock prices. JP Morgan argues that cheap stocks have out-
performed expensive stocks over the last 55 years (up until 2005) 
and that the best recent performers outperformed the worst recent 
performers. The company assumes that human behavioral biases 
explain why value and momentum stocks have outperformed oth-
ers. The tendencies of overconfidence and loss aversion have not 
changed, and JP Morgan is sure that it can outperform in the next 
50 years without changing its investment strategies for overconfi-
dence and loss aversion.
JP Morgan implements its investment strategies in three ways: 
stock selection, portfolio construction, and execution. Stock selec-
tion identifies securities with good value and momentum charac-
teristics. The behavioral finance team employs minimal computing 
power, choosing as many stocks as possible by hand to determine 
which has the best combination of value and momentum. Nowa-
days, they use a quantitative stock selection model to rank stocks 
based on behavioral characteristics, but they still have enough 
manpower to analyze qualitative data. The process is called indus-
trialized common sense. After stock selection, the behavioral finance 
team designs portfolios and executes plans. They construct portfo-
lios by maximizing exposure to stocks with value and momentum, 
while controlling other risk components such as overall risk, sector 
exposures, the total number of securities, and the size or style clas-
sification of the particular fund with an optimization process. JP 
Morgan affirms that portfolio construction cannot be underestimat-
ed, as portfolio managers rely on portfolio construction to recognize 
and understand all possible risks. In JP Morgan’s behavioral prod-
ucts portfolio, stocks are systematically combined to make a barbell 
portfolio, which is undervalued, and has positive momentum in a 
market called “super stock.”
services firm with assets of $2.3tn and operations in more than 100 countries.
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JP Morgan has been selling its behavioral funds Intrepid Inter-
national Funds worldwide since 1995. The fund invests primarily 
in equities of companies from the USA, Europe, or other developed 
countries, and retail customers as well as institutional investors can 
invest in these funds. JP Morgan Private Bank also invests heavily 
in behavioral finance products on behalf of its high-net-worth, in-
ternational clientele. JP Morgan still seeks opportunities to develop 
new behavioral finance products, especially for Asian securities.
Evidence from the Korean Financial Market 
The Asian financial markets can be a useful testing arena for be-
havioral finance researchers. Kim and Nofsinger (2008) investigated 
reasons why scholars study behavioral finance in Asia, and they 
consider this study an important and worthy topic because there 
are empirical and theoretical reasons as to why Asians often suffer 
significantly more due to cognitive biases than individuals from oth-
er cultures. Asia is an interesting place to study behavioral finance 
because of the different levels of capitalism and the experiences that 
many participants face in the financial market. We have also found 
behavioral evidence in the Korean financial market.
The first memorable paper to analyze the Korean market using 
behavioral finance perspectives was by Byun, Kim, and Choi (2005); 
they examined individual investors’ personalities and investment 
behavior. They analyzed real investors’ data from October 2003 to 
June 2004 and found correlations between an individual’s behavior 
and their personality factors. Investors’ characteristics are partially 
related to their personality variables and the degree of confidence. 
Investment behavior was negatively correlated to investment perfor-
mance: the higher the turnover ratio, the lower the return on invest-
ment. According to previous papers, overconfidence leads to exces-
sive trading and this higher turnover ratio results in lower returns. 
However, in Byun, Kim, and Choi’s paper, this relationship was not 
statistically significant because excessive trading was explained by 
personality factors. Investors who were cautious, anxious, open-
minded, or extroverted tended to trade more frequently. However, 
they emphasized that frequent trading would under-perform its 
benchmark in any scenario.
Additionally, Kim and Byun (2009) performed research regard-
ing investor sentiment and stock splits. In 2010, they also analyzed 
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investor sentiment and stock repurchases. Kim and Byun exam-
ined whether the investors’ sentiment affects the market response 
to a stock-split announcement and whether the investors’ emotion 
impacts the market response, which reverses during the 12 sub-
sequent months following a stock split. By using stock-split cases 
from 1999 to 2006, they reported three major empirical results. 
First, the market response to a stock-split announcement is posi-
tively related to investors’ sentiment. Second, the market response is 
stronger, especially for small, young, and highly volatile stocks, and 
market participants are highly likely to be subjective when evaluat-
ing the stocks, and that these stocks are difficult to arbitrage. Third, 
they found a negative long-term performance of split stocks, consis-
tent with Byun and Jo’s (2007) empirical evidence. Moreover, long-
term performance is positively correlated with firm size, while it is 
negatively correlated with investors’ sentiment, controlling for the 
business cycle prior to the stock-split announcement. This result 
implies that the initial market response over-reacts to the stock-
split announcement, depending on firm size and the investors’ sen-
timent. On the contrary, the long-term performance of split stocks 
is not negatively correlated to sentiment without controlling for the 
business cycle at a 10% significance level, and the long-term market 
response is not stronger for small, young, and highly volatile stocks. 
Additionally, Byun and Kim (2010) analyzed investor sentiment and 
market timing by using 835 disclosure samples about stock repur-
chases from 1999 to 2007. This paper, in particular, held implica-
tions for the study of behavioral corporate finance, which has rarely 
been referred to in the Korean financial field. Furthermore, Byun 
and Kim offered proven facts on the timing of decision-making on 
capital funding by using samples of stock repurchases. Lastly, this 
paper highlighted the importance of market timing—which is differ-
ent due to the characteristics of each corporation—since the impact 
of sentiment in the overall financial market does not equally affect 
all companies. This paper has four major findings. First, researchers 
found that there were positive market responses to stock repurchase 
disclosures, which is consistent with previous studies. Second, the 
long-term performance—12 months after stock repurchase—shows 
positive results, and this phenomenon is also consistent with previ-
ous studies because it could be evidence of market under-reaction. 
Third, stock repurchase occurs more frequently in the cold inves-
tor sentiment period. Fourth, according to the results of regression 
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analysis for short- and long-term performance, long-term perfor-
mance is higher in the positive investor sentiment period, and, in 
particular, during the cold investor sentiment period. Long-term 
performance is higher during periods with stronger degrees of cold 
sentiment. 
Byun and Kim (2005) also explained the relationship between 
information value and market efficiency. In this paper, informa-
tion means “daily” recommended stock lists released by securities 
firms10). The first result is that initial market response is positively 
related to information when it is recommended, but there is no ex-
cessive holding period return. When securities firms announce their 
recommended stock lists, market participants recognize this infor-
mation as a valuable source and respond, but it is reflected in stock 
prices on the day of recommendation because there is no excessive 
return. In other words, this result is in line with a semi-strong form 
of market efficiency, since there are initial market responses but 
no excessive return. The second result is that in the case of stocks 
recommended by the large major securities firms, higher market 
responses to smaller volume, and a lower book-to-market ratio of 
recommended stocks are observed. The third result is that since no 
investor can obtain an excessive holding period return, information 
regarding the stock recommendations of securities firms is consid-
ered worthless after investment information is announced.
Yoo and Hwang (2010) applied the disposition effect11) to fund per-
formance in the Korean market. According to the disposition effect, 
a fund manager might sell stocks when the timing is inappropri-
ate, and this quick selling of winners and late selling of losers has 
a negative impact on fund performance, until the momentum effect 
acts in the opposite way. Yoo and Hwang analyzed the relationship 
among turnover ratio, fund performance, and fund capital flow of 
individual investors for the active stock fund, and they referred to 
the previous methodology of Cici (2005) and Xu (2007). The results 
regarding the existence of the disposition effect in fund investors’ 
turnover are as follows. The average turnover ratio between funds 
10) They analyzed 7,544 recommended stock lists of 19 securities firms from April 
2000 to December 2002, and examined characteristics of lists, and whether this 
information was in accordance with the EMH.
11) The disposition effect means that investors tend to sell winner stocks while they 
tend to hold loser stocks, and this significantly affects fund performance, as the 
disposition effect influences the fund manager’s trading activities.
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with unrealized gains and funds with unrealized losses are simi-
lar to one other, and no tendency for the disposition effect can be 
found in Korean fund investments. However, as the turnover ratio 
of institutional investors is higher than that of individual investors, 
the research finds a shorter trend of a holding pattern and a higher 
turnover ratio when compared to institutional investors’ investment.
We find more detailed studies of group investment patterns in 
Chae and Lewellen’s (2005) paper. They divided investors into three 
groups: individuals, institutions, and foreign investors, and stud-
ied the trading behavior of each group within the Korean Stock 
Exchange (KSE). They collected data for almost all stocks in the 
KSE from 1995 to 2000, and they identified the transaction vol-
ume of three investor groups on a monthly basis. They found that 
individuals follow contrarian strategies and buy when stock prices 
fall. On the other hand, institutions and foreign investors follow the 
opposite route, which is a positive-feedback strategy. All investors 
in the three groups tend to show herding and persistent behavior 
when making trading decisions. In the case of foreign investors in 
particular, they use a stock-picking ability, even though contrarian 
strategies are profitable. Interestingly, Chae and Lewellen’s results 
are inconsistent with the view that an individual’s behavior confuses 
the market and exacerbates price movements. Their evidence is use-
ful when evaluating the disposition effect because the disposition 
effect espouses that individuals tend to follow contrarian strategies. 
Their findings also suggest broader and common conclusions for be-
havioral finance, regardless of the particular financial model. First, 
they conclude that there is no supporting evidence that individual 
investors cause price destabilization. According to Lee, Shleifer, and 
Thaler (1991), and Barberis and Huang (2001), behavioral finance 
states that an individual’s trade behavior stems from irrationality, 
and individuals cause the price to move away from the fundamental 
value (i.e. mispricing). However, Chae and Lewellen did not find any 
data supporting this concept. Moreover, individual investors trade 
against price movements when they buy stocks when the prices fall. 
If this is mispricing, it could reduce price movements and lead the 
momentum in returns. Nonetheless, prices in the KSE actually move 
in the opposite direction. This reversed movement is not explained 
by the positive-feedback trade pattern of institutions and foreign in-
vestors. If their trading behavior brings about reversals, then the net 
purchases of foreign and institutional investors would be negatively 
Behavioral Finance 29
correlated with future returns. In addition, investors’ predictive 
power in their trading behavior is likely to be stronger than that for 
past prices. Nevertheless, institutions and foreign investors’ higher 
net purchases show stronger predictive power in future returns; 
net purchases are positively correlated with future returns. For the 
stock-picking ability of foreign investors, net purchases of foreign-
ers are positively auto-correlated and tend to lead the net selling 
by individuals. Lastly, researchers are interested in the result that 
the positive-feedback trading of institutions and foreign investors 
in the KSE tends to lower their performance. Prior research in the 
USA finds that institutional investors also follow positive-feedback 
strategies, but this seems rational, because prices show strong mo-
mentum. However, prices in the KSE move in a reverse manner, 
and even institutional investors follow the same route of a positive-
feedback strategy. This investigation finds that institute investors 
follow the positive-feedback strategies rather than following the mo-
mentum in returns.
Kim and Lee (2009) suggested a model that finds and evaluates 
the signs of anchoring and weak disposition effects. They focused on 
results when the asset return was affected differently by psychologi-
cal effects, as a signal of lagged asset returns such as in the anchor-
ing and adjustment effect, and the disposition effect. They checked 
whether these effects existed in the Korean market as well, and 
they applied one specific method to the Korean stock and housing 
markets. They found that the anchoring and adjustment effect, and 
the weak form of disposition effect, and, in particular, stock returns 
were influenced by the volatility of the previous 2 or 3 years.
Ko and Moon (2010) dealt with FOREX risk related to KIKO 
(Knock-In, Knock-Out) forward contracts in Korea using behavioral 
economics and a law perspective. They argued that the thoughts in-
vestors or bankers had when making contracts might be caused by 
psychological biases and cognitive limitations such as information 
cascades, herd behavior, optimism, and investor myopia. They tried 
to understand exporting companies’ failure to predict potential KIKO 
contract risks in terms of behavioral law and economics. In particu-
lar, they investigated whether the companies were irrational, exces-
sively myopic, and optimistic when they made decisions to enter into 
KIKO contracts. Contracting parties can make sub-optimal decisions 
under these psychological factors, and making unbiased decisions 
should be considered as an important policy goal in financial con-
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tracts. The results showed that human nature and constraints in 
organizational resources caused systematic imperfections. Principal-
agent problems also played an important role in creating incentive 
structures for contracting parties. They also challenged the existing 
research, which overlooks organizational resource limitations and 
heuristic biases that bring disorder to many small and mid-sized or-
ganizations.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Researchers have been introducing new concepts and conduct-
ing studies on behavioral finance over the last 20 years. Although 
behavioral finance is a recent concept, behavioral finance is no lon-
ger a controversial topic, and it has revolutionized finance in a way 
that makes it undeniable. Financial economists have acknowledged 
that human behavior plays an important role in finance and they 
understand that these human elements enrich knowledge in finance 
research. We find that in seven premier finance journals for the 
time period 1990–2010, 8% of the total papers examine behavioral 
finance (See table 4).12)
Studies in behavioral finance emerged from the 1950s with re-
views of market efficiency, and there has been a significant develop-
ment in the behavioral financial research area from 2000, when sev-
eral review papers on behavioral finance were actively released (See 
table 5). Researchers study not only individual behavior, by referring 
to several psychological concepts, but also market inefficiency, by 
considering the limits of arbitrage.
Bloomfield (2006) stated that no behavioral alternative would ever 
rival the coherence and power of the traditional efficient market 
theory because psychological forces were too complex. Therefore, he 
emphasized that behavioral researchers should devote themselves to 
the standard science suggested by their new paradigm and perspec-
tive. For example, behavioral researchers can document and refine 
the understanding of how psychological forces influence individuals’ 
behavior in financial settings, and how those patterns of behavior 
12) The seven premier journals are based on Chan, Chang and Chen (2011). They 
are the Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Financial 
Studies, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Journal of Business, 
Financial Management, and Journal of Banking and Finance.
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affect the market.
Zaleskiewicz (2006) focused on normal investment behavior, 
introducing important concepts from these two growing fields of 
research: behavioral finance and the psychology of investing. He 
discussed three major topics in his essay: investors’ errors from cog-
nitive psychology, emotions in individual investors’ behavior, and 
investors’ preferences toward risk and ambiguity. He also admitted 
that behavioral finance has become more a norm than an extrava-
gance, meaning that the difference between the terms finance and 
behavioral finance will ultimately disappear.
Two major topics are discussed in behavioral finance: the behav-
ioral finance macro, which represents the limits of arbitrage, and 
the behavioral finance micro, which represents cognitive biases, 
Table 4. Number of Articles in Seven Premier Finance Journals during 
1990-2010
Journal Subject Area Number of Researches












































Note: We sort researches by subject area for the time period from 1990-2010.
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Table 5. Major Articles on Behavioral Finance
Year Authors Title Topic
Number of 
Citations

















Prospect Theory: An Analysis 




1985 De Bondt and 
Thaler
Does the Stock Market 
Overreact?
Over-reaction 3,871
1986 Harris and 
Gurel
Price and Volume Effects 
Associated with Changes 
in the S&P 500 List: New 





















1991 Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler










1997 Shleifer and 
Vishny
The Limits of Arbitrage Limits of 
Arbitrage
1,995
1998 Fama Market Efficiency, Long-





1998 Odean Are Investors Reluctant to 
Realize Their Losses?
Loss Aversion 1,774
1999 Froot and 
Dabora
How Are Stock Prices Affected 







Year Authors Title Topic
Number of 
Citations
1999 Thaler Mental Accounting Matters Mental 
Accounting
1,149










2000 Ricciardi and 
Simon




2000 Shefrin Beyond Greed and Fear: 
Understanding Behavioral 






2000 Shleifer Inefficient Markets: An 






2001 Barberis and 
Huang
Mental Accounting, Loss 






2002 Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya
Does Arbitrage Flatten 




2003 Ang and 
Chung







2003 Barberis and 
Thaler










Does Investor Misvaluation 





2003 Malkiel The Efficient Market 
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and many review papers on behavioral finance deal with those two 
major pillars. In particular, Byrne and Brooks (2008) reviewed and 
rearranged several papers in behavioral finance. They note that be-
havioral finance is founded in the assumption that cognitive biases 
influence individual investors, which means that their financial de-
cisions are not completely rational. They also showed some evidence 
that behavioral biases13) stem from cognitive psychology and that 
13) The following topics are examples of biases: 1) Overconfidence and optimism—
investors overestimate their ability and the accuracy of the information they 
have; 2) Representativeness—investors assess situations based on superficial 
characteristics rather than on underlying probabilities; 3) Conservatism—
forecasters cling to prior beliefs in the face of new information; 4) Availability 
bias—investors overstate the probabilities of recently observed or experienced 
events because their memory is fresh; 5) Frame dependence and anchoring—
the form of presenting information can affect the decision made; 6) Mental 
Table 5. (continued)
Year Authors Title Topic
Number of 
Citations
2003 Shleifer and 
Vishny





































2010 Gromb and 
Vayanos





Note: The number of citations is on the basis of Google Scholar.
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accounting—individuals allocate wealth to separate mental compartments and 
ignore fungibility and correlation effects; and 7) Regret aversion—individuals 
make decisions in a way that allows them to avoid feeling emotional pain in the 
event of an adverse outcome.
Table 6. Korean Cases in Behavioral Finance Articles
Year Authors Title Subject Journal
1991 Lee, Shleifer, 
and Thaler








Mental Accounting, Loss 







2005 Byun and 
Kim










2005 Byun, Kim, 
and Choi
Personalities and 











2005 Chae and 
Lewellen
Herding, Feedback 
Trading, and Stock 








2005 Cici The Relation of the 
Disposition Effect to 







2007 Xu Selling Winners, Holding 
Losers: Effect on Mutual 











2008 Kim and 
Nofsinger
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they were applied in several financial fields. 
Byrne and Brooks (2008) also applied the behavioral finance con-
cept to key areas in the financial field such as limits of arbitrage, be-
havioral asset pricing theory, behavioral corporate finance, evidence 
of individual investor behavior, and behavioral portfolio theory.
We also rearrange historical research in behavioral corporate 
finance by introducing two different perspectives: irrational inves-
tors’ and managers’ points of view. We find that many companies 
apply behavioral components and patterns to their real investments 
or corporate strategies, and that these components and patterns 
Table 6. (continued)
Year Authors Title Subject Journal
2009 Kim and 
Byun
Effect of Investor 
Sentiment on Market 







2009 Kim and Lee Dynamics of Asset 
Returns Considering 
Investors’ Asymmetric Risk 
Preferences: Evidences 








and Bank of 
Korea
2010 Byun and 
Kim
Investor Sentiment and 










2010 Ko and 
Moon
How Koreans Deal With 
Foreign Exchange Rate 
Risk: A Behavioral Law 
and Economics Perspective 






2010 Yoo and 
Hwang
The Disposition Effect 
to Fund Flow and 











emerge from theoretical concepts and experimental results. In par-
ticular, some investment products consider behavioral components 
in asset allocation, risk analysis, and valuation.
This paper reviews several factors in behavioral finance, includ-
ing anomalies and cognitive biases, and, in particular, it introduces 
examples found in the Korean financial market. There are still only 
some empirical studies for Korean cases from behavioral perspec-
tives, but we recognize that researchers and investors should con-
sider human elements in the Korean financial market, and they 
should conduct insightful studies about behavioral finance within 
that market (See table 6).
Researchers who believe in the EMH assert that some arguments 
or opinions in behavioral finance are interesting, but they are not 
related to traditional financial theories. They say that we do not 
need to seriously consider the assumption that all investors are ra-
tional, but we just need a few rational market participants. In ad-
dition, scholars in standard finance argue that over-reaction and 
under-reaction, two major phenomena in behavioral finance, can be 
offset by one another, and empirical results explaining anomalies in 
behavioral finance cannot be considered as general and consistent 
theories because they are affected by methods which measure ex-
cessive returns.
We find it difficult to suggest general theories and models in be-
havioral finance, and we also have limited evidence to conduct un-
biased studies combining psychological factors or human elements 
with economics and finance. Moreover, behavioral phenomena 
cannot be easily applied to general or standard circumstances, as 
psychology is a complicated concept, not easily applied. However, 
advances have been made in studies regarding behavioral finance 
over the last 20 years, and researchers have considered behavioral 
finance as one of the important alternative fields. In practice, re-
search and opinions in behavioral finance are used to make invest-
ment decisions and are applied to corporate finance in developed 
markets such as the UA. Therefore, behavioral finance methods can 
enrich the Korean financial market through conducting several em-
pirical studies that are further specialized for Korean circumstances.
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CHALLENGES TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
Some challenges to behavioral finance methods exist. However, 
an important critic explains both over-reaction and under-reaction 
in choosing one psychological bias and applies this to the real mar-
ket. According to Fama (1998), a frequency of obvious over-reaction 
to information is similar to that of under-reaction in terms of EMH 
by considering anomalies as chance results. Abnormal returns that 
occurred previously persist after a certain event, and this phenom-
enon appears in post-event reversal as well. In other words, we can 
find stories ex post that explain abnormal situation anomalies. In 
addition, market efficiency should not be abandoned. Through sev-
eral event studies, Fama showed that long-term return anomalies 
exist, they do not last, and they tend to disappear when any rea-
sonable changes appear, and when the measurement technique is 
amended. In addition, researchers in traditional finance argue that 
behavioral finance does not have any theories or models to integrate 
and explain abnormal situations in general. Although research in 
behavioral finance has developed some models, as discussed in this 
article so far, the models also have limitations, and should not be 
considered as general theories.
Behavioral finance argues that the rational market hypothesis 
has been discredited, but Rubinstein (2001) paused, and recounted 
the considerable number of reasons as to why this hypothesis was 
so generally acknowledged in mainstream finance, at least in aca-
demic circles. In standard finance, we do not seriously consider the 
assumption that all investors are rational. The rational market is 
based on the assumption that rational investors set prices. Although 
the market is not rational, there is no abnormal profit opportu-
nity. At this point, we can say that the market is not irrational, but 
minimally rational. Market rationality is considered a valid concept 
when investors do not recognize much about other investors’ char-
acteristics. In addition, Rubinstein argued that investor irrational-
ity is driven by overconfidence and that it creates a hyper-rational 
market. Rubinstein reexamined market efficiency through several 
historical lenses. He explained six major anomalies14) in terms of 
14) The six major anomalies Rubinstein mentioned are as follows: 1) Excessive 
volatility, 2) Risk premium puzzle, 3) Book-to-market ratio (value vs. growth 
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the EMH, he claimed that many anomalies were just empirical illu-
sions, and he showed that investors did not enjoy excessive ex ante 
expected returns. He also emphasized that several psychological as-
sumptions and phenomena were considered in the EMH.
The financial market has many characteristics that strengthen 
market efficiency against opinions that individual investors’ irratio-
nality determines price. Research in standard finance insists that 
it is too rash to abandon the EMH, and this opinion is considered a 
persuasive theory in the market.
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